ing and governance [Goetz 2009; Ekiert and Hanson 2003] . Rebuilding Leviathan also studies another relatively neglected issue: how post-communist parties have used state resources to survive and thrive in new and typically electorally highly volatile polities with initially weak partisan loyalties [see Kitschelt et al. 1999] -although some of the book's conclusions in this regard have been questioned recently by Gwiazda [2008] . Conor O'Dwyer's insightful Runaway Statebuilding is even more fi rmly focused on the politics of patronage and clientelism. This phenomenon, O'Dwyer argues, could expand freely because of the unfortunate constellation of demobilised societies and partly delegitimised states in this region. In line with Shefter's [1994] classic study, O'Dwyer posits that post-communist democracies are similarly predisposed towards patronage politics because democratisation preceded the establishment of an autonomous, politically neutral state administration. While O'Dwyer extends and checks his main argument in a sample spanning cases across post-communist Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia, the main empirical focus is on Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia between 1990 and 2002.
In his comprehensive essay, which forms the heart of this Special Review Article Section, Seán Hanley surveys the main arguments, measures, and indeed idiosyncracies put forward in both these books. Hanley points out, for instance, that contrary to most work done on this topic by European or EU-based scholars, both books rather downplay the infl uence of the European Union in driving state development. While broadly appreciative of the contribution these books make to the study of state transformation and party-state relationships in CEE, Hanley questions their heavy reliance on -and at times debatable operationalisation of -the notion of 'robust competition' as an explanatory variable. And he insightfully points to a number of signifi cant contradictions, indicating remaining ambiguities or lacunae in both the measurement and the theory of post-communist states. Thus Hanley shows that while for Grzymała-Busse the Czech Republic is an example of a highly exploited state, for O'Dwyer the same country actually boasts a singularly low level of runaway state-building.
I invited Anna Grzymała-Busse and Conor O'Dwyer to reply to Hanley's review article, and they have done so with candour and clarity. Finally, Scott Gehlbach, in refl ecting on all the contributions, focuses on one specifi c issue that has been largely overlooked in both sociological and political science accounts of post-communist public administrations, yet one that is crucial to their positive and normative evaluation: economies of scale in bureaucracy. Other issues remain to be further explored in future research. For instance, the thesis that practices of patronage and clientelism have been part and parcel of post-communist state-building is consistent with much empirical evidence indicating politicians' strong preferences for targetable spending and hiring-and-fi ring whenever the institutional context allows [Keefer 2007; Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009] . One might hypothesise that election-motivated incumbents will prefer to manipulate for political/electoral purposes those particular policy domains that are more tar-getable and timeable to voters. Policies that might meet these criteria include public spending, direct benefi t provision and public hiring and fi ring in public administrations [Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009] . Translated to the post-communist case, this should lead one to expect strong evidence of political business cycle mechanisms in administrative hiring practices. This is an issue that merits more attention in future research on CEE. In the same vein, one might ask to what extent practices such as clientelism or patronage (or even political business cycles) are really more prevalent or more intensive in younger and/or less consolidated democracies like those in post-communist Europe. There appears to be an underlying assumption to this effect in the post-communist literature and in political economy literature more generally [e.g. Alt and Lassen 2006; Keefer 2007 ]. Yet there is evidence of similarly striking levels of political/electoral manipulation of public administration processes even in the best-established democracies in Europe [Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009] . Since stronger institutional constraints (e.g. the institutions of oversight and control) and better informed voters (e.g. though a more independent press) make it more diffi cult for politicians to manipulate monetary and budgetary policies, one might hypothesise that politicians in those contexts may merely shift manipulative practices towards policy domains that are easier to manipulate, such as public sector hiring and fi ring.
I am confi dent, in sum, that this Special Review Article Section of the Czech Sociological Review can further contribute to, and stimulate, an engaged and rigorous future debate about the nature and causes of state building in post-communist states and public administrations. O'Dwyer sees the experience of post-communist CEE as an episode of patronage-based state development, akin to that of Southern Europe, Latin America or US urban politics of the early-mid 20th century and the contemporary politics of many developing countries 7, . Shefter [1994] argued that the ability of parties to pursue patronage-based strategies depended upon the relative timing of the democratisation and bureaucratisation of the state. Where, as in Italy, the advent of mass democracy preceded the formation of a modern state apparatus, incumbent parties were able to use posts in the state administration as a patronage resource. When, as in the British or German cases, a professionalised state apparatus with norms of bureaucratic independence emerged before mass democracy, the state administration was unavailable as a partisan resource. At a structural level, O'Dwyer argues, post-1989 CEE democracies are similarly predisposed to patronage politics because of their demobilised, atomised societies and delegitimised states, and because democratisation in 1989 came before the establishment of an autonomous, politically neutral state administration . Drawing on Shefter's classic defi nition of patronage as the allocation of divisible benefi ts to voters, supporters and members by parties in exchange for political support (RSB: 221) [Shefter 1994: 221 n. 3] , he hypothesises that the key patronage resource exchanged in the post-1989 CEE context are positions in the state administration (RSB: 221 n. 4), which were relatively well paid in relation to other public sector employment.
Analogies with historic cases of democratic patronage politics are, however, not straightforward. As Grzymała-Busse notes, the weakness of post-communist civil society and the marked disinclination of Central and East Europeans to join membership organisations of any kind effectively ruled out the creation of mass organisations and extended client-patron networks characteristic of party clientelism in Southern Europe or Latin America. Moreover, the organisationally weak parties and volatile electorates of post-1989 CEE blocked other key elements of the traditional mass clientelist model such as high levels of elite collusion and party system cartelisation (RL: 186-187). The politicisation of the appointments of state offi cials and their subsequent decision-making in post-1989 CEE, she argues, seem to be less the classic clientelistic 'exchange' suggested by O'Dwyer, than parties' straightforward securing of political control over state resources. The relationship between parties and the state in the region, Grzymała-Busse argues, must therefore be described in new conceptual terms as one of 'opportunistic state reconstruction' (RL: 3) or 'state exploitation'.
As evidenced by the oft-quoted remark of Solidarity Election Action leader Marian Krzaklewski during Poland's 1997 election campaign that he would fi nd jobs in the state administration for four thousand party supporters (RSB: 65), many CEE parties certainly had strong inclinations towards classic patronage strategies. Grzymała-Busse accepts that the practices of some dominant parties such as Vladimír Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and niche groupings such as the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) approximated classic patronage politics (RL: 151). Grzymała-Busse also makes a further signifi cant distinction. Partisan exploitation of the state in post-communist CEE, she stresses, is a facet of post-communist transformation, which feeds off and distorts the politics of liberal reform. Central to her conception, therefore, is the way in which incumbent parties manipulate or delay the creation of a neutral, professional state administration and related oversight institutions, while remaining outwardly committed to liberal norms of public administration Measuring the size and effectiveness of the state administration Both authors seek to measure both the size and effectiveness of the state administration in CEE states. They defi ne state administration in very similar terms as the administrative bureaucracy of central government and the agencies directed by it.
1 Both thus exclude wider employment in the public sector, where, they believe, stricter requirements for professional qualifi cations made politicised discretionary hiring by parties more diffi cult, and where lower salary levels made posts less attractive to potential political appointees. Also excluded are the administrations of autonomous elected local and regional governments, whose varying structures and competences make systematic cross-national comparison problematic (RL: 233; RSB: 14-15). Size is measured by both authors mainly in terms of employment and expenditure. O'Dywer works with data obtained from national statistical offi ces, which he re works for maximum comparability. Grzymała-Busse presents a range of statistical data from a variety of national and international sources, but mainly focuses on labour force surveys carried out using standardised EU categories. She also tracks the growth of extra budgetary funds and parastatal agencies, which she sees as a particularly signifi cant indicator of politicised administrative expansion .
Effectiveness proves a more diffi cult concept to operationalise. Grzymała-Busse assesses it by tracking the development of independent formal institutions of oversight and monitoring likely to constrain corrupt and partisan exploita-1 Grzymała-Busse defi nes state administration as the 'central and territorial offi ces of the national state: employees of the ministries, regulatory and fi scal agencies, social security and labor offi ce administration and their territorial branches' (RL: 233), O'Dwyer defi nes it as the 'set of positions most directly linked to the policies of national government' (RSB: 13). He also introduces an additional concept, 'national-level state administration' (RSB: 207). However, as defi ned, this too seems to overlap quite closely with the concept of 'state administration' used by Grzymała-Busse. tion of the state, such as ombudsmen, national auditing offi ces, securities and exchange commissions, and legislation defi ning and protecting the status, job security and career structure of civil servants (RL: 25-28). Even when weak and unembedded, she argues, such new oversight institutions and laws exercise a constraining or deterrent effect on party abuse of the state (RL: 151-154). She also undertakes public opinion surveys in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Bulgaria and Poland, seeking to assess state effectiveness by gauging the (perceived) importance of party political infl uence in the eyes of the public in the hiring of staff and making administrative decisions on everyday matters, such as the granting of building permits (RL: 144, (242) (243) (244) (245) (246) .
O'Dwyer, by contrast, sees confi gurations of formal institutions and party funding regimes as broadly similar across his three cases. Moreover, he claims, even when established more quickly or more extensively, formal oversight institutions are suffi ciently unproven and subject to political manipulation as to be a poor indicator of effective governance and administration (RSB: 17). Instead, he tracks state effectiveness, through the development (or absence) of Weberian norms in both existing and new state institutions, specifi cally: the predictability of civil servants' career paths; the development of an ethic of professionalism; the emergence of clearly understood (and consistently enforced) boundaries between public and private interests; and the bureaucratic autonomy and independence from party political infl uence of offi cials (RSB: 5). He seeks to access these processes by conducting semi-structured interviews with state administrators in his three case study countries, asking how secure they feel from party political pressure, and soliciting their views about the size, effectiveness, levels of professionalism and nature of career paths in their respective state administrations. In addition, O'Dwyer triangulates by carrying out parallel interviews with politicians, NGO activists and journalists. However, the statistically small numbers of offi cials (52 respondents in the Czech Republic, 43 in Slovakia, 70 in Poland) and the snowballing technique O'Dwyer uses to make contact with interviewees undermines the presentation of his fi ndings as survey data enabling generalisations about the different national state administrations (RSB: 82-83). The very broad anonymity that he grants interviewees, which in most cases even extends to the institutions they work in, also makes it more diffi cult to gauge how widespread the trends he highlights are.
2 The battery of direct questions he uses also lacks the sophistication of Grzymała-Busse's survey, which deploys hypothetical 'vignettes' to probe beyond initial unrefl ected or self-serving responses by interview subjects.
Both authors additionally discuss policy areas which they see as particularly signifi cant or indicative for the study of partisan abuse of the state. Grzymała-Busse examines party funding regimes and privatisation processes, both of which she sees as potentially facilitating state exploitation. Public funding of parties is an obvious means for political parties, including the incumbent parties central to Grzymała-Busse's concept of 'state exploitation', to obtain resources from the state. Lax or poorly enforced regulatory regimes in turn offer an important conduit for both overtly corrupt payments and improper (if sometimes legal) donations to incumbents from state-owned companies, which are notionally private entities. Privatisation, she suggests, can create an 'informal funding regime' offering a rich source of kickbacks for incumbent parties . O'Dwyer seeks to examine the operation of patronage-driven 'runaway state-building' in the transformation of communist welfare states, focusing on health and pension reforms (RSB: 141-169). The gap between universal welfare, health and pension entitlements and those actually received by the public, he suggests, can be seen as an additional indicator of state performance. The elimination of communist-era practices of health and welfare professionals receiving informal payments from the public, he thinks, is a particularly important subsidiary indicator of such 'phoney universalism' and hence of state (in)effectiveness.
Divergent fi ndings
Both authors fi nd that numbers of state administrators have generally increased across CEE since the collapse of communism, both absolutely and relative to other parts of the public sector. However, O'Dwyer's estimates of personnel numbers are consistently and considerably lower than Grzymała-Busse's preferred measure. Employment levels in CEE state administrations given in the other sources cited by Grzymała-Busse also vary markedly. For example, while O'Dwyer's calculations indicate that that the Czech state administration employed 38 667 people in 1993, the sectoral labour force survey favoured by Grzymała-Busse gives a fi gure of 132 700 (RSB: 209; RL: 239). As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate, even where and when the two books' case selections and timescales do overlap, it is still diffi cult, to say the least, to fi nd common trends in the patterns of growth.
Overall RL and RSB do agree broadly as to where and when 'runaway' growth has occurred. Both authors fi nd that Slovakia experienced comparatively high levels of ineffective state growth. Citing World Bank governance indicators, O'Dwyer also agrees with Grzymała-Busse that apparatuses in Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia underwent little administrative bloating, while Latvia and Bulgaria, like Slovakia, had highly exploited and over-expanded states. RL and RSB also both judge Poland to be an intermediate case.
3 However, the two authors differ sharply in their assessment of the Czech Republic. For Grzymała-Busse the Czech state ranks fi rmly with Slovakia and Latvia in the cluster of highly exploited states (RL: 4-5), while for O'Dwyer it has the lowest levels of 'runaway state-building'. Grzymała-Busse fi nds that over the period 1990-2004 employment in the Czech state administration more than doubled and that, at 5.7%, the average annual growth rate in the number of employees in the Czech state administration was among the highest in the region. Moreover, key countervailing and monitoring institutions in the Czech Republic such as regional government, a national audit offi ce, an ombudsman or a securities and exchange commission were set up belatedly or in emasculated form. Indeed, in some instances, such as that of the Czech Supreme Audit Offi ce, the independence and power of existing oversight institutions was reduced.
O'Dwyer, by contrast, using a different timeframe, calculates a mere 16% increase in the number of employees in the Czech state administration between 1993 and 2000, while for Poland and Slovakia over the same period he fi nds increases of 55% and 71% respectively (see Figure 1) . He also fi nds that Czech state offi cials report little party political interference and are developing a growing ethos of professionalism and bureaucratic independence, although he stresses 1993 1994 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 Source: Calculated from data in Runaway 209. that such bureaucratisation should be seen as a process, not a consolidated outcome or inevitable trend. In his two higher growth cases, Polish and Slovak interviewees detect no such trends. In Slovakia civil service careers are bounded by 'purge mechanisms', with offi cials supportive or opposed to Vladimír Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) departing en masse as the party's fortunes waxed and waned. In Poland, he fi nds a more confused situation: the Polish state administration is politicised, unprofessional and unstable because offi cials appointed by different parties at different times co-exist awkwardly. Many Polish offi cials also try to hedge their bets by establishing contacts across several party networks.
Explaining ineffective state growth
Both authors then seek to explain the politicised and ineffi cient growth in CEE state administrations. Their initial reasoning largely coincides. They agree that, to some extent, the increased ineffi ciency is explicable by the new demands placed on the state for new forms of regulation and administration generated by more 1993 1994 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 complex, pluralistic market societies. However, they conclude that, given the similar social changes across CEE, growth in the state administration is simply too variable to be explained in purely functional or historical terms. Such variation, both writers agree, cannot be explained by the provision of additional public goods, given an obvious mismatch with rates of economic growth (RL: 44-45). Nor can it be explained as a by-product of state-building in newly independent nations such as Slovakia or the Baltic states. As Grzymała-Busse notes, between 1990 and 2004 the number of employees in Estonia's state administration grew little, while in neighbouring Latvia the number of state administrators more than quadrupled (RL: 4). Moreover, in Slovakia the number of employees in the state administration grew more rapidly not in the immediate aftermath of independence in 1993, but in the mid-1990s, at a time of intense political confl ict between the government of Vladimir Mečiar and its political opponents (RL: 45) Although the pattern of democratisation preceding state reform found in CEE confi rms Shefter's classic insight, as both authors rightly note, it does little to explain the pronounced patterns of national variation in the growth and effectiveness of state administration.
Legacies and the role of the EU
As Grzymała-Busse observes, state reconstruction in transitional societies is a process of 'bricolage' involving renovating and reconfi guring existing institutions as much as designing new institutions from scratch. However, although she notes the more technocratic composition of state administrators in more liberal communist regimes of 'national accommodation' such as Hungary and Poland, she dismisses communist regime legacies as an infl uence on state exploitation, arguing that while rates of elite turnover in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland were similar, levels of partisan state exploitation varied (RL: 46). She therefore concludes that in this case '[h]istorical legacies of state development mattered less than the immediate competitive context ' (RL: 21) . O'Dwyer explores the possible role of historically national administrative traditions more thoroughly. Kitschelt's notion of Czech communism as a 'bureaucratic authoritarian' regime drawing on a pre-communist modernity and Austrian bureaucratic traditions [Kitschelt 1995; Kitschelt et al. 1999] , he accepts, does prima facie offer an alternative explanation for the superior performance of the Czech state administration. However, he reasons that if national administrative culture exercised greater infl uence than party competition, we would expect to fi nd constrained growth in the Czech state administration at the local as well as the national level, despite the different institutional structures and the weakness of party organisation in Czech local politics. However, he fi nds 'runaway' growth levels in personnel numbers in Czech local administration. Like Grzymała-Busse, he therefore rules out any causal impact of distinct national political-cultural legacies.
Both authors also downplay infl uences from the European Union. O'Dwyer draws on work on regionalisation in CEE accession states to argue that the tough-ness and tightness of EU conditionalities were exaggerated, and in practice CEE political elites were easily able to instrumentalise and exploit the Union's vaguely framed requirements. Grzymała-Busse adopts a similar line of argument, but allows that the EU did exercise some leverage over 'laggard' states, prompting them belatedly to create a host of formal oversight institutions in the period 2002 -2004 . Indeed, in her case study analysis she suggests that 'EU pressure' was the key reason why the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Latvia created any such institutions at all (RL: 104, 130, (157) (158) 163) .
Party competition and state reform
Having eliminated alternative explanations, both authors then argue that the key explanatory factor is to be found in patterns of party competition. Both Grzymała-Busse and O'Dwyer argue that 'robust competition' can check structurally embedded tendencies towards partisan exploitation of the state (RL: 14-15). However, each understands 'robust competition' and its effects differently. For Grzymała-Busse its defi ning feature is a distinct, clearly identifi able opposition party or bloc that continuously and effectively criticises governing parties, rather than colluding or allowing itself to be co-opted, and thus represents a plausible alternative government. She rejects conventional measures of party competition such as party system openness, fragmentation, party turnover, electoral volatility or ideological polarisation. Such conventional measures, she argues, do not indicate whether incumbent parties faced a credible threat of replacement and may simply highlight the rise of uncoalitionable extreme groups or protest parties (RL: 51-58). Instead, Grzymała-Busse presents her own tripartite index of robust party competition based on: 1) the extent of regeneration of the former ruling communist party into a moderate centre-left bloc; 2) the average number of critical parliamentary questions asked by opposition deputies; and 3) the average seat share of plausible parties in a national parliament since 1989 (RL: 14). The nature of such 'plausibility' is left somewhat vague, but seems essentially to consist in programmatic coherency, moderation, and elite competence in the eyes of both voters and potential coalition partners.
Grzymała-Busse's polling confi rms signifi cant, but varying, levels of corruption by offi cials. However, with the partial exception of Slovakia, there is little evidence of traditional mass party patronage extending to the lower levels of the state administration. However, comparing clusters of state exploitation and patterns of party competition, she fi nds that, while conventional indices of party system competitiveness have little explanatory power, 4 there is a close correlation between robust party competition, as she conceptualizes it, and levels of parti-san abuse of the state (RL: 50-57). In Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Latvia, where for long periods dominant parties of left, right or centre faced no effective opposition, there were higher levels of state exploitation. In all cases, she believes, the lack of robust early party competition was rooted in the weakness of the anti-communist opposition or the failure of communist successor parties to regenerate themselves promptly into a credible moderate centre-left bloc. The reverse, she fi nds, was true in Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, and, to a more limited extent, Poland.
O'Dwyer agrees that to prevent runaway state-building 'the only effective constraint is a credible opposition party or parties, which voters can use to punish parties that push patronage too far' (RSB: 13). However, O'Dwyer's conception of robust party competition stresses an important precondition largely missing (or at best implicit) in Grzymała-Busse's account: that robustly competing parties need not only be critical and credible, but must also be institutionalised, in order to offer voters a meaningful choice based on a 'manageable number of stable parties with familiar coalition-building preferences' (RSB: 7). Drawing implicitly on a long-running debate in US political science about the optimum forms of party competition and party-society linkage, which dates back to the seminal APSA report of 1950 [David 1992; Pierce 1999 ]; Epstein 2000], he terms this a 'responsible' party system and defi nes it in terms of low levels of fractionalisation and electoral volatility, limited party turnover, a relatively high degree of 'closure' to new entrants, and in most cases bi-polar competition (RSB: 27-28).
Of his three case study countries, only the Czech Republic, he judges, has a responsible party system. Party systems with generalised party fragmentation, high party turnover and high electoral volatility, such as that of Poland, he argues, represent a 'weak governance model', with little vertical accountability of parties to voters, high levels of party patronage and signifi cant 'runaway state-building'. In weak governance models, O'Dwyer argues, the use of the state administration for patronage is the necessary glue for binding unstable, ideologically unwieldy coalitions and is politically less costly for parties in confused unstable systems as the lines of voter-party accountability become blurred. The inability of weak unstable governing parties to take full control of the state apparatus and to purge their predecessors' appointees in such systems also leads them to sponsor the creation of new state agencies, exacerbating tendencies towards 'runaway statebuilding' (RSB: 25-26).
Finally, O'Dwyer notes the existence of a 'dominant party system' model, exemplifi ed by the case of Slovakia, wherein a powerful, well institutionalised incumbent party, such as Vladimír Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), or elsewhere Franjo Tuđman's Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), faces a fragmented unstable, ideologically diverse opposition, which has diffi culty offering a united or coherent alternative to voters (RSB: 26-27). The consequence of this, argues O'Dwyer, is the relentless politicisation of appointments in the state administration in favour of the ruling party. When such dominant parties are toppled in elections by opposition coalitions, O'Dwyer suggests, a second variant of the dominant party model ensues: disparate and divided new governing coalitions struggle either to turn the 'purge mechanism' against well entrenched supporters of the dominant party in the state administration or to introduce reforms constraining partisan abuse of the state. The result is a deadlocked situation which preserves the status quo of a politicised, ineffective and oversized state administration. The relationship between the four variants of party competition he identifi es and the levels of 'runaway state-building' is also confi rmed by his regression analyses testing his hypotheses against a larger pool of some fi fty new democracies in post-communist Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia . The extent to which welfare and health entitlements go unmet and informal practices persist, O'Dwyer fi nds, matches the patterns of 'runaway statebuilding' he identifi es in state administration and, he believes, are explicable in the same terms as a consequence of different patterns of party competition.
How does robust competition inhibit partisan abuse of the state? In both accounts 'robust competition' is seen as having a constraining effect because it enables effective monitoring of incumbents by opposition parties. However, beyond this, the two authors see robust party competition as working through different mechanisms. For Grzymała-Busse the key constraining mechanism inhibiting party abuse of the state is the anticipation of electoral defeat by incumbents. Fear of ultimate electoral defeat, she argues, leads them to the pre-emptive establishment of institutions of monitoring oversight and control. Such institutions are a self-interested insurance policy by incumbents to ensure that, when defeated, they are not permanently excluded from the political game by opponents able to mobilise state assets against them (RL: 15-17). For O'Dwyer, whose concept of state effectiveness stresses Weberian bureaucratisation within institutions rather than the development of new ones, robust competition leads to the absence of major party-inspired institution building. In his view, where new institutions are created because of pressures exerted by party competition, their formation is usually a politicised process leading to the foundation of fl abby and ineffi cient structures.
Conceptual advances and methodological challenges
Runaway State-building and Rebuilding Leviathan are outstanding pieces of comparative analysis, which, taken together, succeed in establishing plausible links between patterns of party competition and the development of post-communist state administration, and each makes important conceptual contributions. Grzymała-Busse is innovative in rethinking 'state exploitation' as a category distinct from traditional patronage, while O'Dwyer offers theoretically richer accounts of sub-optimal types of party competition and the relationship of state offi cials and parties. Despite some divergence in methods and fi ndings, their overlapping assessments do enable us to identify two clear sub-groups of CEE states, one where post-communist state administration has emerged as relatively effective and unpoliticised (Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia), and another where the outcome is clearly the reverse (Slovakia, Latvia). The two books' sometimes diverging judgments also highlight important unresolved issues concerning the operationalisation and measurement of the size and effectiveness of the state administration in CEE, forms of 'robust competition', and the nature of party political encroachment on the state.
The authors' divergent assessments of the evolving size of CEE state administrations raise important issues about the extent to which current levels of state performance can be regarded as consolidated (or consolidating) outcomes. Both authors identify leaders and laggards in CEE by comparing the state on the eve of EU accession with the situation in [1989] [1990] . But such snapshots can be misleading. If we measure outcomes at different time points -or across different time periods -rankings can appear quite different. For example, recalculating Grzymała-Busse's fi gures of growth in state administrative employment for the pre-accession period of 1990-1998 -when domestic party competition should have played a more clear-cut role, given the absence of explicit EU conditionalities -we fi nd a much less clear-cut pattern of clustering into high and low exploitation cases. Hungary and Estonia are again confi rmed as having low levels of growth in the size of the state administration, while Latvia again appears as a laggard with numbers tripling. All other states, however, including Bulgaria, appear as essentially intermediate cases with growth in the range of 50-90%. Indeed, measured across the 1990-1998 period, Bulgaria ranks as an intermediate case with growth in state administrative employment only slightly below that of Poland. None of this necessarily invalidates Grzymała-Busse's argument. One can credibly argue that there was an ongoing process of differentiation among CEE state administrations. However, this perhaps suggests that comparative state development in the region is a more dynamic, fl uid and ambiguous process than either book allows.
A related methodological issue is that of the baseline against which the state development and the unfolding party-state relationships of CEE should be measured. Grzymała-Busse's labour force survey data allow her to use 1990 as a baseline, while O'Dwyer, who was unable to obtain satisfactory separate data for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic before the break-up of Czechoslovakia, uses 1993 as a starting point. Although they do not fully explain them, such different baselines have signifi cant consequences for both the comparative levels of state expansion found and the explanations that might plausibly account for it. For example, much of the expansion -and the high mean annual growth rate in -the Czech and Slovak state administrations detected by Grzymała-Busse over the 1990-2004 period can actually be explained by a spike in employment that occurred in 1991-1992. Over these two years, Grzymała-Busse's fi gures record, there was an increase of 24% in the number of employees in the state administration in the Czech Republic and of no less than 48% in the Slovak Republic, from 56 531 to 83 767 -a gain of 27 236 employees, which represents the bulk of the overall increase in the period 1990-2004. After 1993, as Figure 1 illustrates, ac-cording to Grzymała-Busse's fi gures, the year-on-year increases for Slovakia were relatively modest, although, consistent with her analysis, the growth rates in the size of the state administration in the Czech Republic were quite high in the early years of the Klaus government.
It is unclear whether the 1991-1992 spike that Grzymała-Busse records refl ected a genuine expansion in employment, administrative re-organisation connected with the re-structuring of the federal Czechoslovak state, or merely a change in statistical methodology. If it is more than a statistical artefact, it is also unclear whether such growth can be explained by the accounts of party competition that Grzymała-Busse provides, given the fl uid and emergent state of both the Czech and Slovak party systems in 1991-1992. Although such questions may be answerable within a party system perspective of the kind that both authors favour, these unresolved measurement-related issues undermine their comparative fi ndings and give them a somewhat provisional feel.
The books' other divergent fi ndings regarding party competition can simply be explained by the different yardsticks the two authors use, allowing their arguments to some extent to be synthesised. There is, in principle, no reason to suppose that the growing trend towards bureaucratic professionalism that O'Dwyer fi nds in the Czech state administration cannot co-exist with Grzymała-Busse's fi nding that the Czech state lacks effective or extensive oversight institutions. When combined, these fi ndings raise the intriguing prospects that formal oversight institutions may not be the only route to state effectiveness or, more worryingly, that increasingly professionalised state administrations can work in symbiosis with party political abuse of the state.
Similarly, Czech party competition can be viewed as robust in O'Dwyer's sense, in that it has relatively stable, well institutionalised, programmatic parties, but as lacking robustness in Grzymała-Busse's meaning, because its mechanisms for alternating between left and right are inadequate owing to the presence of a strong anti-system party, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). At bottom, for Grzymała-Busse 'robust competition' is a mechanism of horizontal accountability, in which parties keep each other in check, while for O'Dwyer party systems are more a classic channel of vertical accountability, allowing voters to punish unsuccessful or miscreant politicians. There is no reason to suppose that vertical and horizontal mechanisms of constraint could not operate simultaneously, suggesting that the Czech party system is perhaps more intermediate in its effects than either author allows.
Visegrád and beyond
A further criticism that can be levelled is the books' overdependence on the experience of the four Central European Visegrád states (V4) to derive key analytical propositions. Grzymała-Busse defends this approach on the grounds that the Baltic states, Slovenia and Bulgaria are 'diffi cult cases where standard measures of party competition would lead us to expect opposite outcomes' (RL: 24). Leaving aside pragmatic considerations, such as the availability of secondary literature or the Central and Eastern European languages most commonly spoken by Western researchers, there seems no strong reason to consider such cases more complex than the V4. Indeed, methodologically, it might be equally valid to develop an analysis based on Baltic or South East European cases and test it on the Visegrád states. In general terms, the non-V4 cases bear out Grzymała-Busse's broad arguments. However, they also point to a need to refi ne or qualify her model. Slovenia's low levels of state exploitation and well structured competitive party system, for example, confi rm the importance of the early social democratisation of communist successor parties for the establishment of robust party competition. However, the long-time lack of alternation in the Slovenian party system suggests that O'Dwyer's notion of robust competition as expressed in institutionalised divisions between programmatic parties may be a more valid perspective on Slovenia.
Estonia ranks second only to Hungary in minimising the ineffective politicised growth of the state administration. However, its party system lacked any clear left-right demarcation based on the regime-opposition divide, had no signifi cant communist successor party, reformed or otherwise, and until 1996 had no state funding for parties, suggesting that, as in the Latvian case, 'informal funding regimes' should have burgeoned. Grzymała-Busse argues that Estonia avoided the Latvian experience because of its strict state regulation of political parties (RL: 192), because of the multiplicity of coalition combinations that its relatively fragmented party system afforded, especially given the weakness of the (potentially uncoalitionable) Russian minority parties, and because Edgar Savisaar's social liberal Estonian Centre Party (EK), in opposition for most of the 1990s, played a role equivalent to that of reformed communist successor parties elsewhere in CEE as 'the most vehement critic of successive governments' (RL: 72). Here Grzymała-Busse's book provokes many questions that might enrich her account (RL: 192) . What kind of party consolidation mechanisms substituted for the regime-opposition divide in Estonia? Did strong national minority parties in highly exploited states, such as Slovakia, Latvia and Bulgaria, affect the range of credible coalition alternatives? Was Estonia's policy of building its own embryonic state institutions and state personnel de novo in the late 1980s in any way signifi cant?
O'Dwyer's ambitious extension of his Visegrád-derived model to new democracies across Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America provides broad aggregate support for his general propositions. However, it seems problematic in its coding and its assumption that a fourfold typology of party systems developed on the basis of three CEE cases can safely capture patterns of party competition across four continents without concept stretching. Indeed, even his codings of party systems within the wider post-communist region highlight some of the limitations of his typology. 1996 -2002 Estonia 1996 , 1998 Latvia 1996 -2002 Lithuania 1996 -2002 Macedonia 1996 -2002 Moldova 1996 -2002 Romania 1996 -2002 Slovenia 1996 -2002 O'Dwyer categorises party systems in terms of a fourfold typology of party competition using a two-step procedure. First, he assesses the degree of dominance of the main incumbent party by measuring whether its electoral support exceeds that of its nearest rival by a margin of more than 20% over successive elections. Then, for party systems without any pattern of dominance, he examines levels of electoral volatility and the extent of party system institutionalisation using indices and expert judgments in the secondary literature to determine whether they fall in the 'low governance' or 'responsible party' category (RSB: 171-175). Each national party system is examined at four points, in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002, allowing party system change to be captured. O'Dwyer's operationalisation of his party system typology and categorisation of party systems are summarised in Table 1. However, as O'Dwyer is aware (RSB: 179), his categorisation of post-communist party systems generates some obvious incongruities. The 'weak governance' category groups a large and disparate group of states, ranging from Slovenia -one of the best performing nations for administrative effectiveness -to intermediate cases such as Poland, to countries with highly politicised, low quality state administrations like Bulgaria and Romania -and even post-Soviet states such as Moldova and Ukraine, considered by some analysts to be neo-patrimonial states on a par with contemporary Africa [van Zon 2001] . O'Dwyer does not provide precise details of his calculations or the indices used to measure party system institutionalisation, noting only that he does his own assessment of instutionalisation for East European cases using the criteria in the main text (RSB: 247 n. 8). O'Dwyer seems to dichotomise cases outside post-communist Europe into high and low institutionalisation systems using scorings from several secondary sources. However, this is not explicitly stated. The author only comments that the scales used in composite indices of institutionalisation in secondary sources vary, but that 'the methodologies are broadly consistent'. It is also unclear where scores for electoral volatility are obtained or how these are calculated, although O'Dwyer does mention that some of the composite indexes of institutionalisation he drew on incorporated measurements of volatility (RSB: 173).
It is also unclear precisely why Slovenia's party system has been categorised as an under-institutionalised 'weak governance' system (RSB: 218-219). Although more fragmented and multi-polar, it has many of the characteristics of the stable, programmatic 'responsible party' model developed on the basis of the Czech experience [Hloušek 2001] . A possible over-reliance on fragmentation and conventional measures of volatility, which fail to distinguish shifts in support between established parties from more fundamental changes in party system format, may have led to an incongruous categorisation here. Similarly, the dynamics of Romanian (and to some extent Bulgarian) party politics appear to have more in common with the second variant of the 'dominant party' model. 5 Despite their periodic electoral victories over the post-communist forces which had initially dominated early post-transition politics, liberal opposition blocs quickly faltered in government when faced with vested interests and internal tensions.
Revising O'Dwyer's categorisation along these lines tends, paradoxically, to confi rm his argument about the relationship between types of party competition and the quality of the state administration. However, it also points to some of the conceptual shortcomings in his analysis and lends weight to Grzymała-Busse's call for the formulation of new concepts of political competition better tailored to the realities of CEE and a more thorough thinking through of the nature of party 'dominance' in the region (RL: 57 n. 102).
Both authors also tend to underestimate the complexity and dynamism of party systems even in the V4 states, often concertina-ing them into their respective typologies. Thus, O'Dwyer's depiction of a robustly competitive Czech party system (RSB: 58-63) glosses over the period of dominance of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the early-mid 1990s, when centre-left forces in the Czech Republic were as inchoate and divided as anywhere in CEE. Grzymała-Busse in turn downplays the effectiveness of the opposition of the resurgent Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) after 1995, rather implausibly suggesting that Klaus's ODS still seemed 'invincible' after the 1996 parliamentary elections, when its vote remained static and the centre-right coalition it led lost its parliamentary majority (RL: 212). Her comment regarding ČSSD that 'until the late 1990s it had less than 6% of the vote' (RL: 74) is also indicative. ČSSD polled 26.44% in the 1996 parliamentary elections, not the 'late 1990s', and its vote in the 1992 Czech and Czechoslovak elections was, in fact, somewhat above 6%. Similarly, as Grzymała-Busse hints (RL: 51, l02), O'Dwyer's characterisation of the Polish party system as anarchic and lacking ideological coherence is overstated. Polish parties and party blocs have often proved short-lived and fi ssiparous. However, ideological camps in Polish politics have shown greater continuity [Tworzecki 2003 ]. This weakens O'Dwyer's interpretation of patronage as a substitute for ideological affi nity.
Partisan abuse, privatisation and the welfare state
Arguably, neither author is wholly successful in extending their argument beyond their main focus, the size and character of the central state bureaucracy. Grzymała-Busse fi nds evidence of laxer party funding regulations in less competitive systems, but there seems little support for her suggestions that incumbent parties used state funding to gain signifi cant fi nancial advantage over parliamentary opponents. The most signifi cant effect of party funding regimes seems to have been to favour large parliamentary parties and weaken new and extra-parliamentary challengers, rather than shore up incumbents. It is also unclear how directly or reliably privatisation per se offered an illicit income stream for parties. Even in high exploitation cases such as the Czech Republic, illicit or concealed payments to parties seem often to have taken the looser form of interest groups buying generalised political infl uence and access [Myant 2003: 123; see also Reed 1996] . The key objection Grzymała-Busse raises in relation to the applicability of traditional models of party clientelism in CEE -that classic clientelist exchange is unworkable in an unstable and unpredictable transitional environment -seems to apply a fortiori to party corruption in privatisation. As Martin Myant [2003: 123] observes of the Czech case, the complexity of privatisation processes and the kaleidoscope of confl icting individual, institutional and party interests made corrupt exchanges an uncertain proposition. Corruption in Czech privatisation, Myant concludes, was thus …not a case of simple "cronyism" in which fi rms are blatantly sold off to friends and allies of those in power. The process was less reliable, more secretive and more obscure, partly because with competing parties in a coalition government, there was not a single, controlling political elite. (…) A wise prospective buyer might have made donations to all the coalition partners and possibly the opposition parties too.
O'Dwyer's extension of his 'runaway state-building' perspective to postcommunist welfare states in CEE is also problematic. Although certainly linked to broader administrative effectiveness, welfare state performance -and especially that of welfare states in transition -is arguably too complex to be reduced to a simple party system perspective. As O'Dwyer himself notes, many of the problems of Slovak and Polish health care in the 1990s stemmed from fi scal problems, not party competition. Similarly, as Vanhuysse [2006] has argued, the buying off of potentially disruptive groups in Poland through generous early retirement schemes seems to refl ect 'strategic social policies' and the key role of trade unions in both the main Polish centre-right and centre-left blocs, not the dynamics of a weak governance system. Very similar early retirement policies were followed in Hungary, a state which both authors see as having a relatively effective, compact state administration and a robustly competitive party system. O'Dwyer's characterisation of reform outcomes in health and welfare across his three cases also seems somewhat incomplete. Czech 'success' is predicated too much on the early introduction of notionally private health insurance funds, public opinion and levels of spending, while Poland's early reform of its pension system is largely overlooked. Moreover, Slovakia has since leapfrogged both the Czech Republic and Poland by implementing radical reforms of the welfare, health-care and pension systems. Indeed, O'Dwyer's own recent work argues that 'second stage' neo-liberal reforms in Slovakia after 2002 were facilitated precisely by its weakly institutionalised, fragmented party system, which empowered promarket technocrats [O'Dwyer and Kovalčík 2007] . Why similar dynamics did not apply to welfare reform in fragmented CEE party systems during the 1990s is unclear.
Communism, democracy and the state in contemporary CEE
Like much work on the comparative politics of CEE after 1989, both studies rest upon broad-brush assumptions about the nature of communist rule, which are very largely substantiated using comparisons of the present, rather than historical research. Such comparative strategies are not always wholly convincing. O'Dwyer's national-local control comparison of party competition and growth in state administration, for example, arguably overlooks important aspects of the evolving relationship between the central and the local interests. Owing to decentralisation after 1989, growth in local state administration could be expected for purely functional reasons. In fact, the evidence presented suggests that it was localism not party patronage strategies that exerted the greatest pressure for fragmented and administratively irrational growth in local and government (RSB: 117, (136) (137) . Highly centralised communist regimes had often deliberately disregarded historic boundaries and local identities when fi xing territorial-administrative units. After 1989 the legacies of such centralism, the weakness of grassroots party structures, and the overlapping nature of local elites [Vajdová 2003 ] often combined to create a strong form of localism which centred on demands for the break-up of communist-era units and the creation of new communes and municipalities. This resulted in an explosive growth in the number of communes and municipalities in Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republic.
Finer-grained, historically grounded studies examining the relationship of parties, bureaucrats and society further upset generalised assumptions about communism as a system of one party rule decaying into patronage and patrimonialism. For instance, Horak's recent [2007] study of urban governance in Prague suggests that administrators in some sectors such as transport already had a distinct ethos of professionalism and considerable stability and bureaucratic autonomy under state socialism and were, in consequence, highly resistant to political interventions both from the ruling Communist Party before 1989 and from democratic politicians after 1989. This undermines the conventional framing of the debate about the infl uence of the communist past (found in both RL and RSB) as a question of distinguishing distinct national regime legacies from generic legacies of communism, suggesting that in some cases sectoral divisions between ministries and policy areas appear equally important. More signifi cantly in the context of this essay, it also calls into question O'Dwyer's stress on the development of classic bureaucratic structures as a path to democratic consolidation. Horak's work suggests that the problem after 1989 was not bureaucrats' lack of Weberian professionalism but their hostility to public consultation and the participation of civil society organisations in policy-making.
O'Dwyer explicitly defends the need for the (re-)establishment of classic forms of hierarchical bureaucracy, rather than more networked forms of 'new governance', as a necessary fi rst step for new post-transitional democracies. However, both authors shy away from any assessment of the future of the party-state and party-society relations in CEE or the wider debate about parties and the state in contemporary democracies in Western Europe and North America and beyond [Mair, 1994; Kopecký and van Biezen 2007] . This is problematic. While the CEE of the 1990s can (and should) be studied as a democratising region, it seems increasingly anachronistic to contrast the region to 'the advanced, industrialised West' (RSB: 205). In the context of an enlarged EU it seems unlikely that CEE states can or will develop along classic Weberian lines. Here, further exploration of the relationship of parties, state administration and the delivery of public services, prefi gured in O'Dwyer's book, may prove especially revealing.
The ) that the instability and weak democratic norms of the region's parties make them untrustworthy custodians of the state, rendering consensus-based or corporatist models of democracy inappropriate and even dangerous. Such a constrained view of the region's democratic possibilities is characteristic of much literature of the reform politics of CEE.
The books' stress on overcoming the communist past through the development of a liberal state with checks and balances and a classic Weberian bureaucracy has also to some extent been overtaken by recent debates about the rise of illiberal populism in CEE. Both conclude their accounts on the eve of the EU accession in 2002-2004, largely missing the rise to offi ce of parties such as Poland's Law and Justice Party (PiS) or Slovakia's Direction Social Democracy party (Smer), as well as the increased infl uence of more radical parties drawing on the anger and alienation of 'transition losers' [Krastev 2007 ]. The experiences of the Baltic states and Bulgaria also highlight the somewhat different phenomenon of 'centrist populism' [Účeň 2007] , exemplifi ed in the rise and fall of parties such as Estonia's Res Publica or Bulgaria's National Movement of Simeon II (NDSV). The latter parties' promises to govern more cleanly and reform more energetically appeal to broader public appetites for 'newness as a project' [Sikk 2006] , rather than the simple economic grievances of transition 'losers' If, as Ivan Krastev [2007] has suggested, we must increasingly accommodate such electoral insurgencies as part and parcel of the democratic process, we may need to think beyond a 'responsible party' model centring on the bi-polar alternation in offi ce of well institutionalised, 'plausible' parties of left and the right. In his thoughtful review essay, Seán Hanley addresses both the common themes of Runaway State-Building and Rebuilding Leviathan and their points of divergence. I, too, am struck (and pleased) that the two books speak to each other so directly, and I am grateful to Seán Hanley for such a detailed critique. In my comments, I will focus on a few critical points and clarify where possible a) the central analytical issues involved; b) the meaning and specifi cation of state size; and c) the role of party competition.
SEÁN HANLEY is Senior Lecturer in East European Politics at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London. He has previously published on party development, euroscepticism and right-wing politics in East-Central Europe. He has a special interest in Czech politics and is the author of
The central analytical concern in Rebuilding Leviathan is explaining how competition among political parties, hungry for resources and well-placed to prey on the state by dint of their access to policy and governance, resulted in distinct confi gurations of state institutions. These state institutions are not limited to the civil service: they range from central state administration, to formal institutions of oversight, to party funding regimes. To clarify, the book concerns itself less with what the state was able to do (state effi ciency) or sheer state size, and more with how the state was rebuilt, and to whose benefi t (state politicisation.) The key actors are political parties, who constrained -or enabled -each other's exploitation of state resources.
State size alone is neither the central preoccupation of the analysis, nor the key indicator of state politicisation -as I note in the book, the mechanisms of state expansion and state politicisation indicate whether or not the state expanded to meet functional demands, or as a result of the entrenchment of political party interests. After all, state employment may increase as a result of new demands placed upon the state administration, patronage hiring by party organisations burgeoning with members (as Conor O'Dwyer and other scholars of clientelism have argued), or as the result of political parties creating new state agency fi efdoms for their elites, which justify increased spending and hiring (as I argue). Without a careful examination of how the growth occurred, employment increases themselves (or the changes in the rates of increase) have little to tell us. * Direct all correspondence to: Anna Grzymała-Busse, University of Michigan, Department of Political Science, 5700 Haven Hall, 505 S. State Street, Ann Arbor MI 48109, e-mail: abusse@umich.edu.
That said, the differences that O'Dwyer and I fi nd in the rates of growth of state administration broadly confi rm each other, as do several of the other indicators of state employment (see Appendix B of Rebuilding Leviathan for the correlations between the various indices.) I also fi nd that other indicators of state politicisation corroborate my fi ndings regarding state size. At the same time, the discrepancies in our accounts point to the enormous diffi culties with measuring state size, especially given low state capacity to accurately and precisely measure its own employees. Moreover, state administration size tends to oscillate over time, lurching upwards instead of smoothly increasing, making extrapolation and triangulation all the more diffi cult. As we both note, however, the means and location of the increases matter far more than the numbers alone.
Nor can we take other indicators of state politicisation, such as the creation of formal institutions of regulatory oversight or party fi nancing laws, simply at face value. The number of formal institutions that arose is not as relevant as the timing of their foundation, their regulatory powers and the extent of partisan control over them (RL: 82-86.) By the same token, whether or not the state formally funds parties matters less than the strictures and constraints that are imposed (and enforced) on this funding: the degree to which state fi nancing of parties is transparent, regulated, and well enforced. When such funding regimes prevent new entrants to the political market, they in effect help to ensure the dominance of existing political parties. Finally, privatisation per se did not benefi t the parties simply because political parties sold off enterprises and directly benefi ted political allies (though there were some notable cases, notably in Slovakia and in Latvia). Rather, the processes of privatisation allowed political parties to pack enterprise oversight boards, create new domains of state regulation and control of privatisation, and channel funds to quasi-state agencies: in short, to build the state and simultaneously expand party control of state agencies and resources.
Turning to political competition, and the context in which it operates, a few points need clarifi cation. It is not the case that competition alone mattered, of course. As Rebuilding Leviathan notes, political legacies inherited from the communist fusion of party and state played a signifi cant role, in two ways. First, the communist successor parties became both the main critic of post-1989 governments, and the lightning rod themselves for criticism. In this way, they became a mainstay of robust party competition. In exceptional cases, such as Estonia, highly controversial fi gures and parties could serve as analogues, as Edgar Savisaar and the Estonian Centre Party (EK) did. Second, and even more importantly, the communist state itself left behind a legacy of politicised hiring, limited oversight, hollowed-out institutions, and partisan control. This was the baseline for postcommunist state-building efforts: and this situation is responsible for the overall diffi culties faced by state-building political actors in the post-communist setting.
These legacies of the communist party-state were all the more critical, given the importance of the sequencing of state institutions and state domains. In the analysis of the building and exploitation of the post-communist state, the relevant political sequencing is not 'Shefterian' -i.e. whether democracy preceded the rise of a bureaucracy, or vice versa (especially since his central argument involves the difference between internally and externally mobilised parties, a central distinction that is missing from most empirical tests of Shefter's argument). Rather, the critical sequencing is whether new constraints and oversight are imposed onto an existing, unwieldy, and highly politicised state apparatus, or onto nascent new domains of state action. Regulation that arose concomitantly with the state domains to which it is applied (such as securities and exchange commissions and stock markets) could be so much more effective than that imposed on existing and entrenched sectors (such as the civil service.) This sequencing goes a long way to explain both why existing state sectors proved so intransigent to reform across the post-communist cases, and why there is variation in the politicisation of newly arisen state sectors. The establishing of a securities and exchange commission eight years after the rise of the stock market, as was the case in the Czech Republic, facilitated murky ownership patterns, tunnelling, and unclear property rights. That said, we need to specify the actors responsible for this sequencing, who undertook the decision to hasten or to delay the introduction of some of these new state institutions.
Party competition in this context explains the variation in state politicisation and differentiates the patterns of state formation. It is a primary direct infl uence on state (re)building, since a) political parties were directly responsible for constructing new institutions of the state (along with the market and democracy), and b) other potential explanations have little empirical support. As Hanley notes, O'Dwyer and I specify political competition rather differently. Rebuilding Leviathan conceptualises robust competition as competition that is clear (the camps are easily discernible to the voters), critical (parties monitor and publicise each other's misdoings), and plausible (as measured by the percentage of parties explicitly excluded from potential coalitions by all other parties. Parties that were excluded from governance a priori could not be plausible alternatives to incumbents). Runaway State-building sees political competition as characterised by a responsible party system, where a few institutionalised, predictable competitors anchor party competition. Rather than viewing this simply as conceptual confusion, one way to characterise these differences is that I focus on the means of, and O'Dwyer on the opportunities for, political constraint.
Precisely because O'Dwyer's set of measures includes turnover and fragmentation and mine do not, we code our cases differently. These differences may lead to some misunderstanding. For example, the long-term incumbents in Slovenia were re-elected to offi ce -but were nonetheless constrained by the opposition, I argue, because clear and credible opponents continually and severely criticised the incumbents in parliament, spawning no less than six government party crises. Similarly, the number of opposing parties (or camps) is far less relevant than their observed behaviour.
Conversely, precisely because all three factors are jointly necessary for robust competition, the absence of one greatly weakens the constraining effects of competition. Thus, I agree with O'Dwyer that, after 2004, party competition in Poland became far less robust -the disappearance of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) meant that no clear alternative remained to Poland's Law and Justice Party/Civic Platform (PiS/PO). Recall that until the two diverged in their modus operandi during the Kaczynski premiership, they were assumed to be natural coalition partners. To illustrate further, this tripartite characterisation of competition also means that the Czech Republic generally had low levels of robust competition -not only in the early years of the transition (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , when the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) were polling less than 10% in public opinion polls, but after their 1996 electoral victory as well. The resurgence of the Social Democrats in public opinion polls over the course of 1995, and their 27% vote share in the 1996 elections did not make ČSSD an effective opposition. Again, numerical strength and duration in offi ce are not indicators of the robustness of competition. The Social Democrats' parliamentary criticism remained muted: the party did not increase its challenges to the Civic Democratic Party's (ODS) policies in parliament (as measured by parliamentary interpellations or investigation attempts.) And whatever criticism the opposition could have provided subsequently was dampened by the Opposition Agreement of 1998-2002, and the Communist Party's (KSČM) continued ostracism. Since KSČM could not be a part of any governing coalition, ODS and ČSSD were stuck with each other -both during the period of the Opposition Agreement and then in the series of deadlocks that followed in the 2000s.
I am grateful to Seán Hanley for his engaged and critical reading of the two books, and I hope I have cleared up some outstanding analytical issues. The analysis of the state needs to go beyond the civil service -as I have also argued, employment in the central state administration is only one facet, and one potential indicator, of state politicisation and opportunistic state reconstruction. The 'heavy reliance' on party competition as an explanatory variable does not preclude a serious consideration of communist legacies. Further research can indeed help us to refi ne both the conceptual apparatus, and the empirical fi ndings on post-communist states.
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Re-stating Party Development in Central and Eastern Europe:
A Response CONOR O'DWYER* University of Florida, Gainesville I would like to begin by thanking Seán Hanley for his perceptive and stimulating reading of these books. For me, it is still surprising that two books that were conceived, researched, and written independently could speak so directly to each other in so many respects. There are divergences and differences of opinion, naturally, but as Hanley's review skilfully shows, even the seeming disconnects between accounts may in many cases actually highlight cross-cutting dynamics in the complex and sprawling process of state-building. Perhaps, however, the dialogue between these books is not as surprising as it fi rst appears. Theorising about the development of the state was largely (and inexplicably) a neglected aspect of the monumental political and economic changes after the fall of communism. Analyses of the post-communist state were, for the most part, applied in nature, not comparative in a theory-building sense. In the past few years this has changed, with several new studies appearing besides the ones reviewed here [Ganev 2007; Kopecký 2007; Gehlbach 2008] . I expect the debates to continue and to deepen -which is for the good. This is how the fi eld moves forward.
Hanley makes many trenchant and constructive observations, drawing connections that push both works in new research directions. Rather than focus point by point on Hanley's remarks, however, I would prefer to address my response to a few broad themes that span both books.
How to compare states
Every political scientist or political sociologist agrees that the state is of paramount importance, but after that, it seems, the consensus breaks down. It sometimes seems that the wealth of literature on the state constitutes our own academic version of the resource curse. If the state is so central and its infl uence so pervasive, where do we draw the boundaries and distinctions necessary for comparative analysis? How should we defi ne the state? What makes one state more effective than another? Supposing we can agree on these issues in principle, how shall we * Direct all correspondence to: Conor O'Dwyer, University of Florida, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 177325, Gainesville, FL 32611-7325, e-mail: codwyer@ufl .edu. proceed in comparing and classifying real, existing specimens? What measures shall we use?
These are the questions that Anna Grzymała-Busse and I both confronted when we began the research that developed, respectively, into Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-Building. We each faced decisions about these various trade-offs, and, as the reviewer observes, we came up with sometimes similar, sometimes different strategies for resolving them. One unintended benefi t of this new wave of research into the evolution of the state after communism may be to prompt refl ection on what constitutes the irreducible core of the state (at least for the purposes of comparative analysis) and how we should measure the state capacity of that core. Having grappled with these decisions, however, I rather doubt that any such consensus will emerge. That statement does not refl ect any pessimism about the possibility of progress in the study of the state. It is simply a recognition that these decisions are not choices between right and wrong but rather trade-offs between analytical depth and breadth under the constraints imposed by the costs of gathering data. When concepts are diffi cult to measure, it is often more advantageous to use small-N, qualitative techniques; such techniques, of course, also have drawbacks of their own.
The depth-breadth trade-off is most evident in the problem of measuring patronage. Because it has the taint of the abuse of power (not to mention moral corruption), patronage politics poses very direct problems for measurement. It seems that the proverbial 'man in the street' in every post-communist country believes his politicians and offi cials are corrupt. While this is certainly an indication of the character of state-building after communism, in order to make comparisons about the culture of the state administration and the practices of political parties, I chose to survey the opinions of people who had direct knowledge about them. This necessitated in-depth, semi-structured, elite interviews with representative, if not random, sampling. Even recognizing the possibilities for bias in such interviews, I believe they gave the most valid picture of the multifaceted issue of bureaucratic practice and politicisation of the state. The problem is that such interviews do not scale well to large random samples of the sort that would support statistical analysis. On the other hand, practical and methodological problems beset large random samples on this topic: the diffi culty of sampling administrative elites, the complexities of discussing a charged topic like patronage, to name just two. This is an inescapable dilemma, and my decision was to focus on a few countries where I could achieve in-depth and nuanced measurement of a complex concept.
Recognising the depth-breadth trade-off does not, of course, eliminate the risk around any particular compromise along its poles. To minimise that risk, in Runaway State-Building I compared my assessments of state capacity and professionalisation with third-party measures such as the World Bank's 'Governance Matters' indicators. Following a mixed-method strategy, the book also probed other areas of state-building, such as the welfare state and regional decentralisation: did the picture there match the relationship between political parties and the state that I found in the administration? As Hanley notes, I also 'scaled up' the comparative analysis in one of the fi nal chapters of the book, testing the hypotheses developed in the country case studies against other post-communist countries, as well as new democracies in other regions. According to Hanley, my large-N analysis contained debatable coding choices for some countries' party systems, most notably Slovenia's. I am happy to learn that, in Hanley's opinion, I miscoded Slovenia. Rather than being an anomalous case of a weak governance system with high state capacity, as I took it for, it is actually a responsible party system and, so, its high governance scores actually support my argument.
The larger methodological point here is important, though. In scaling my argument to include so many different party systems across regions and time, streamlined coding rules were needed and had to be applied conservatively. When faced with borderline cases such as Slovenia, I coded them 'against' the preferred hypothesis. As I note in the book, Slovenia's electoral volatility, one of my primary coding criteria, was only moderately high in the period under consideration, but it was noticeably higher than in responsible party systems like Hungary and the Czech Republic. Moreover, unlike the other responsible party system in the region, Estonia, it was not declining over time. In the interests of consistent and conservative coding, therefore, Slovenia was coded as a weak governance system for the statistical analysis.
The problem of comparing state growth across countries provides another illustration of the depth-breadth trade-off. As others have noted, cross-national comparisons of state employment data should always be treated with caution; offi cial categories and counting methods both tend to differ by country. To understand the nuance and complexities of the data, I opted to construct comparable categories for just three countries in consultation with experts in their national statistical offi ces. Attempting a similar task on the scale of even the nine countries in Grzymała-Busse's study would be exceedingly diffi cult. It was for these reasons again that, in my chapter of broader cross-national analysis in Eastern Europe and beyond, I left state growth out of the analysis, focusing instead on the World Bank's measures of state performance.
Finally, the different territorial dimensions of the state (central, regional, district, and local) add yet another level of complexity to the study of the state. Runaway State-Building sought to exploit this internal variation for additional analytical leverage, using it to probe political culture as an alternative explanation for how states develop. If the dynamics of state development differ internally (that is, at different levels of a state's territorial administration), it would be diffi cult, I argued, to invoke national administrative culture as an explanation. As Hanley suggests, there is a complicating factor here. State expansion at the local level was conditioned by municipal consolidations that had occurred under communism, consolidations that were undone in a wave of municipal secessionism in the early 1990s (RSB: 136-137). Ideally, one could assess the role of patronage politics at the local level by separating out personnel expansion resulting from the sheer growth in the number of municipalities -for example, by comparing personnel statistics in breakaway vs. non-breakaway municipalities. I did not have this level of data, but even the data I had suggested that the expansion of local state personnel, where it occurred, was not simply a function of growth in the number of municipalities. First, there is the issue of timing. While the vast majority of municipal secessions occurred between 1989 and 1992, the trend of personnel expansion was constant throughout the 1990s (RSB: 211). Second, while the trend of municipal secessionism was far less pronounced in Poland, it had comparable rates of locallevel personnel growth as the Czech Republic. Finally, the case of Slovakia, which also experienced municipal secessionism in the early 1990s but saw a decrease in the number of local state personnel, shows that personnel growth is not necessarily just a function of growth in the number of municipalities.
Party system institutionalisation and patronage politics
Party competition is the second area where these books manage to simultaneously overlap and diverge. Both posit that party competition is crucial to constraining state politicisation, but what kind of party competition? This dialogue on what constitutes robust party competition stands as perhaps the most fruitful contribution of the books as a pair. Hanley meticulously summarises the arguments on both sides; I would simply repeat that my overarching emphasis is on party system institutionalisation as a means of generating vertical accountability. Institutionalisation leads to parties with longer time horizons and provides voters with more manageable, meaningful choices at election time. Party competition in the absence of party system institutionalisation cannot be expected to constrain patronage politics; on the contrary, it may exacerbate it, as heterogeneous government coalitions substitute patronage for ideological coherence to keep their partners on board.
In the time since both books were written, events on the ground, in the case of Poland at least, present the opportunity to re-examine the relationship between party competition and state-building directly. Poland's experience under the Kaczyńskis' government of 2005-2007 is instructive for a number of reasons. First, it vividly illustrates the dangers that underinstitutionalised party competition poses for state-building. Second, it shows again the pitfalls of taking 'administrative reform' at face value. Administrative reform is often less about ending politicisation of the state than it is a means for disrupting extant party-state relationships in the hope of replacing them with new ones. Third, this episode allows us to reassess our analytical framework to refl ect a political environment that has, as Hanley suggests, been reshaped both by European Union membership and the rise of illiberal populist political parties.
The 2005 parliamentary elections in Poland revealed a party system that, though undeniably competitive, is still in deep fl ux -marked by high volatility, unpredictable coalition-making, and low barriers to entry. The incumbent postcommunist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), which had won some 40% of the vote in the previous elections, imploded. Two relatively new parties, the Kaczyńskis' Law and Justice (PiS) and Civic Platform (PO), captured most of the vote. During the campaign they were seen as natural coalition partners, with PO expected to be the senior coalition partner. Instead, PiS eked out a narrow victory over PO and, contrary to expectations, eventually formed a government with two radical populist parties, the left-agrarian Self-Defence (SO) and the ultra-nationalist, ultra-Catholic League of Polish Families (LPR). In many respects, it was a government of political outsiders, comprising parties that differed sharply in key programmatic respects but which did share an overall sense of retaking politics from a corrupted political elite.
It was under these conditions, reliant on the support of recently established parties with differing programs but eager to take advantage of the perquisites of government, that Law and Justice undertook its mission to combat corruption and cleanse the Polish state of, in its view, the lingering infl uence of communist collaborators and agents. It sought to build a 'Fourth Republic', to be distinguished from, again in its view, the communist-infused governments that had followed from the Round Table agreement in 1989. The goals and language recalled those of Electoral Action Solidarity (AWS) in 1997, but in many ways the project, of which 'civil service reform' was inevitably a part, seemed even more expansive.
Runaway State-Building argued that repeated civil service reforms under different governments in an under-institutionalised party system serve as a better indicator of patronage-infused state-building than of real civil service reform. In August 2006, the PiS-led government enacted Poland's third major civil service reform since 1989. As in previous rounds of reform, this latest version was a fundamental restructuring of the system from basic principles. It thereby gave the governing coalition a free hand to restructure the relationships and networks forged in the state administration under previous governments. It is worth noting that Poland was under absolutely no pressure to enact this reform from the EU. (Indeed, given the Kaczyńskis' rhetoric about the EU, one cannot help but wonder, half-seriously, whether such pressure would not have dissuaded them from the project.)
Whereas the system adopted in 1998 had attempted, albeit with limited success, to create a career civil service on the French model, the 2006 reform centralised the most important staffi ng decisions in the Offi ce of the Prime Minister and either eliminated or weakened independent oversight institutions. The new system put an end to the goal of a civil service independent from the government, and it largely undid the idea of defi ning professionalising career-paths for officials. Instead, it maximised the discretion of the Prime Minister's offi ce in fi lling state appointments, while abolishing the Offi ce of the Civil Service and the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Civil Service. Rather than reserving the most important state posts for members of the civil service, as before, the reform created a 'state staffi ng pool' from which candidates could be drawn to fi ll any top state post. Ironically, criticism by independent organisations and policy experts of the failures of implementation in the 1998 law provided much of the rationale for the 2006 restructuring. Yet, in my conversations with representatives of these organisations in summer 2007, they tended see the new system as deepening the state's politicisation, noting that the centralisation of appointment powers in the Offi ce of the Prime Minister enhanced the government's capacity to reward supporters with state positions.
Certainly, the wave of scandals that characterised the Fourth Republic's brief reign suggests that the link between party infl uence and state administration remains uncomfortably close. The agrarian populist Self Defence, in particular, was accused of aggressively placing its activists in ministries and state offi ces under its control. Its leader, Andrzej Lepper, publicly exhorted his party leadership to employ party activists in state institutions wherever they could, proclaiming at a party congress, 'That's why we're in the coalition, so that we can employ our cadres' [Quoted in Kącki 2007d] . Where there were not enough positions for party loyalists, new positions were created [Kącki 2007b] . In one such scandal, a journalist challenged a Self Defence parliamentarian accused of illegally promoting party activists in the state, 'Shouldn't state offi cials be politically independent?' The parliamentarian replied, 'SLD [the post-communist party] did the same thing [when it was in power]' [Quoted in Kącki 2007c] . In May 2007, evidence emerged that, in addition to fi lling the administration with loyalists, it was the party's policy to demand 5-7% of the salary of such appointees -paid into the Agricultural Trade Union 'Self Defence', founded by Andrzej Lepper [Kącki 2007a ]. The use of patronage was most glaring (even unabashed) with Self Defence, but subsequent reporting suggested that it was not alone in such practices. Even parties like PO, which cultivates a reputation for policy expertise, professionalism, and liberalism, had party resolutions requesting 'obligatory donations' from persons fulfi lling public functions 'on the recommendation of PO' [Zieliński 2007 ].
In July 2007, a corruption scandal in the Ministry of Agriculture prompted Andrzej Lepper's (SO) dismissal from the cabinet. Premier Kaczyński announced that ending political corruption would be a precondition for the continuance of the coalition. Interestingly, Kaczyński's language in a letter to his coalition partners seemed to acknowledge that the problem of patronage plagued all of the governing parties: 'The criteria for recruitment into the state administration and public institutions must be exclusively meritocratic. It is necessary to relinquish immediately the ongoing -especially in the course of the last few weeks -practice of nepotism in some state agencies. This principle applies in equal measure to all coalition partners' ['Treść listu…' 2007] .
I dwell on Poland's recent experience because, while I appreciate Hanley's suggestion that we remain open to the possibility of emergent new infl uences in East Central Europe's ongoing state-building, I believe that this experience shows the continued relevance of the party competition perspectives laid out in both books. Undeniably, the impact of the European Union is much more immediate than it was in the 1990s. It is also true that the rise of illiberal populists since 2004 represents an important new development in the region's political development [Ost 2005; Vanhuysse 2008 ]. Yet, as Poland's experience indicates, the EU is still far from determinative for the course of state-building. One might even argue that the EU's infl uence will be less important as time goes on because the postcommunist states are no longer subject to the close monitoring and conditionality that they were before membership.
The surge of populism that has occurred in much of East Central Europe since around 2004 prompts Hanley to wonder about relevance of the responsible party model of institutionalised competition for the future. The deeper question is: what is the connection between illiberal populism and state-building, and does this phenomenon signal the need for new theory? First, there is no denying that the language of illiberal populism -with its exhortations to take politics back from a corrupt elite and restore it to the 'people' -can form the pretext for disruptive and politicised interventions into the state administration. In Poland, the Kaczyńskis' successful electoral campaign was premised on smashing the 'układ', a nebulously defi ned network of corrupt politicians, offi cials, and former communists. As described above, once in power PiS undertook a massive 'reform' of the state, which in the eyes of most experts only further politicised it. One could also argue that the Kaczyńskis' electoral success was premised on the failure of previous Polish governments to contain political corruption and patronage, lending credence in voters' eyes to their crusade against the układ.
The second part of the question is, however, whether a new theory of statebuilding is needed for a new phase of populist politics in post-communist Europe. I would say no for a couple of reasons. First, it is still too early to judge just how long the current populist moment will endure. In Poland's 2007 elections, Self Defence and the League of Polish Families failed to cross the minimum threshold for parliament. Second, while their language is perhaps more shrill than before, populists are not a new phenomenon in post-communist Europe, as Ost [2005] shows in Poland, or as was seen in Slovakia under Mečiar. But most importantly, I would argue for the continued relevance of an analytical framework based on party competition because the populist turn can be easily accommodated within that framework. Just as Mečiar's populism destabilised Slovak politics in the period covered in Runaway State-Building, the appearance of illiberal populists can be conceptualised as a factor that impedes party system institutionalisation and, therefore, as a precipitant of runaway state-building. As party systems become more institutionalised, it becomes more diffi cult for populist parties, where they persist, to enter government and to leverage their coalition-making potential for political benefi ts. It may be, as Hanley suggests, that populism will make the responsible party pattern harder to achieve, but persistent under-institutionalisation and politicised state-building is, sadly, an outcome that is perfectly consonant with the theoretical framework.
For East Central Europe, the fall of communism in 1989 was the sort of rare sharp shock that fundamentally transforms the forces at work in the usually slow-moving and history-laden processes of state-building and party system development. Both of the books reviewed here recognised that, in the often chaotic developments that followed, there lay an opportunity to revisit core questions and assumptions in our understanding of both states and party competition. The region's different state and party system trajectories are still far from set, and as Hanley observes, both books 'shy away' from explicit policy prescriptions and speculation on 'the future of the party-state' (see p. 1173 of Seán Hanley's review in this issue). That they do so is an implicit recognition of the ongoing 'openness' of this historical moment, an openness that may also serve as an invitation for further research. Like Grzymała-Busse and O'Dwyer, I have become convinced over the past years that understanding why post-communist states evolved as they did is critical to explaining the divergent fortunes of countries in the region. In the process, I have wrestled with the question of what makes one state more effective than another. Obviously there is no one answer to this question, but any investigation must include the sheer number of individuals in the administrative apparatus. In work with David Brown and John Earle (two leading experts on post-communist privatisation), for example, I fi nd that plausibly exogenous variation in the size of regional bureaucracies in Russia helps to explain cross-regional variation in the impact of privatisation on fi rm performance [Brown, Earle and Gehlbach 2008] . 1 Viewing Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-Building through the prism of my own experience, I was therefore struck by the centrality of a seemingly simple issue: how to measure the size and growth of bureaucracies. Both Grzymała-Busse and O'Dwyer are meticulous in their compilation of data on administrative employment. As they each emphasise, however, the issue extends beyond valid * Direct all correspondence to: Scott Gehlbach, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 110 North Hall, 1050 Bascom Mall, Madison, WI 53706, e-mail: gehlbach@polisci.wisc.edu. I am grateful to Maria Belodubrovskaya, John Earle, and Pieter Vanhuysse for many useful comments on this paper, and to David Brown and John Earle for their collaboration on the project that informs much of the argument here. 1 Spoiler alert: We estimate that privatisation is more effective in regions with relatively large bureaucracies, the apparent consequence of a relatively hospitable post-privatisation business environment in those regions.
and reliable measures of the number of bureaucrats. Bureaucracies are large or small relative to what they are asked to do.
In our work on Russian bureaucracy and privatisation effectiveness, David Brown, John Earle, and I found that in measuring bureaucracy size it was critical to account for economies of scale in state administration. More populous regions generally have fewer bureaucrats per capita than less populous regions, a relationship that I document below. Because regional population might also exert an independent effect on the relative performance of privatised fi rms (e.g. through attractiveness to investors), failing to control for economies of scale in state administration could bias the estimated effect of bureaucracy size on privatisation effectiveness.
In principle, the same relationship should hold across countries. To take a simple example, each country needs only one central bank chief. It would therefore be inappropriate to say that Estonia's central bank chiefdom (1 chief per 1 300 000 residents) is larger than Russia's (1 chief per 142 000 000 residents). Of course, the difference would not be so stark if we looked at all central bank employees, as a large country will generally need more staff than a small one. But some economies of scale are likely.
In this note, I expand upon this perspective, using data on regional variation in bureaucratic employment in Russia to illustrate the importance of accounting for economies of scale in state administration. I then show how this approach can add to our understanding of the East European states discussed in Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-Building.
In focusing on the size of bureaucracies, I ignore a range of other issues covered by Grzymała-Busse and O'Dwyer: institutional design, the distribution of administrative positions across parties, bureaucratic turnover and compensation, and so forth. I do so not because I believe these issues are less important, but because I have less to say about them. I also largely skirt the issue of what is responsible for changes in the size of state administrations, the central focus of both books, though I will have a bit to say about one potential explanation that I believe deserves further attention.
Economies of scale in Russian state administration
The theoretical justifi cation for economies of scale in state administration is straightforward: administrative labour is a critical input into public-goods production, and the consumption and distribution of public goods are characterised by economies of scale. To the extent that state administration employees are engaged in public-goods production -staffi ng anti-monopoly and environmental protection agencies, for example -we should therefore observe fewer bureaucrats per capita in more populous political units.
The argument can be seen most clearly by considering the ideal type of a public good, where what economists refer to as 'jointness of supply' is extreme.
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The cost of producing such goods is fi xed, so that 'each individual's consumption…leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good' [Samuelson 1954: 387] . The larger the number of individuals who consume the good, the lower the per-capita cost of their production. In particular, if the participation of a fi xed number of bureaucrats is necessary to produce a public good that can be enjoyed by all residents of a region, then the per-capita cost of producing that good -measured as bureaucrats per capita -will be less in more populous regions. Figure 1 illustrates this tendency using data from 1995 on state administration employment at the regional level in Russia.
3 There is a clear negative re-2 Public goods are also characterised by 'non-excludability', such that it is impossible to exclude individuals from their consumption. Non-excludability is a classic rationale for the government provision of public goods, as such goods may not be provided by the market. 3 Data are from Rosstat, the Russian state statistical agency. Regional data on state administration employment are unavailable before 1995; the depicted relationship is quite simi- lationship between regional population and state administration employment per capita. Chukotka, the smallest region in the dataset, had 16 bureaucrats per 1000 residents in 1995. The city of Moscow, the largest region in Russia, had only 3.4. The fi t is tight: fully 70% of regional variation in the number of bureaucrats per capita is accounted for by economies of scale in state administration.
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the main point: failure to account for economies of scale in state administration may result in misleading characterisations of bureaucracies as 'small' or 'large'. For each fi gure, I divide regions into three groups of equal size, corresponding to bureaucracies that are relatively 'small', lar for later years. State administration employment is defi ned as employment in federal, regional, and local public administration per 1000 residents. Employees in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government are included, with the exception of personnel in the Ministries of Interior and Defense. Approximately three-quarters of these employees are classifi ed as civil servants, with the remainder secretaries, drivers, and other support staff [Brym and Gimpelson 2004] . Data from 2004 suggest little systematic variation across regions in the ratio between the two. 'medium', and 'large', respectively. Figure 2 depicts this classifi cation using data on the number of bureaucrats per capita, unadjusted for economies of scale in state administration. Figure 3 depicts the analogous classifi cation using data that adjust for economies of scale in state administration, that is, the residuals from a regression of log state administration employment (per capita) on log population. 4 Differences in shading in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that a region switches classifi cation after adjusting for economies of scale in state administration. For some regions, the difference can be substantial. Sverdlovsk, for example, governed from 1976 to 1985 by Boris Yeltsin, was the eleventh-smallest bureaucracy in Russia in 1995 before accounting for economies of scale in state administration, but the fi fteenth-largest after doing so. More broadly, if we do not control for Relative size of bureaucracy Notes: Data from 1995. 'Small', 'medium', and 'large' are defi ned as the corresponding terciles of the residuals from a regression of log state administration employment per 1000 residents on log population. population in this way, we miss the generally large scale of bureaucracies in western Siberia and underestimate the relative size of bureaucracies in much of the south of European Russia. Overall, the pairwise correlation of the two underlying measures of bureaucracy size is 0.54.
Measuring bureaucracy size and bureaucratic growth in Eastern Europe
To what extent is variation in the size of bureaucracies across East European countries accounted for by economies of scale in state administration like those observed at the regional level in Russia? To answer this question, I use the crossnational data reported in Table B .5 of Rebuilding Leviathan, which are based on government statistical offi ce reporting of data for category L of the Statistical Classifi cation of Economic Activities in the European Union (NACE). Below I discuss related data from Runaway State-Building, which examines a smaller set of countries. Beyond this general resemblance, there are two important differences between 1992 and 2004. First, there is a secular increase in bureaucracy size during this period: the regression line jumps upward. This development is consistent with the notion that an increase in state administrative capacity was necessary during the transition period to compensate for the withdrawal of the Communist Party (under socialism, many administrative tasks were carried out by the Party rather than the state) and to provide institutional support for the market economy. It is also consistent with a generalised desire to exploit the state for political reasons, as described in Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-Building.
Second, there is a much tighter fi t around the regression line in 2004 than in 1992.
5 Wherever they started, post-communist bureaucracies seemed to converge during the transition period to a size consistent with their population. Thus, Hungary -which started the transition period with a relatively large bureaucracy, given its population -added few state administration employees between 1992 and 2004. In contrast, Bulgaria's bureaucracy grew by leaps and bounds, nearly catching up to its predicted level by 2004. Figure 4 suggests another way of looking at bureaucratic growth in postcommunist countries: did a country converge to or diverge from the level pre-dicted by its population, given the secular increase in bureaucracy size during the transition period? Viewed from this perspective, only two countries exhibit patterns of growth inconsistent with convergence: Latvia and Slovakia. Beginning the transition period with a relatively small bureaucracy, Latvia overshoots the mark, so that in 2004 its bureaucracy is larger than that predicted by its population. In contrast, the absolute change in the size of Slovakia's bureaucracy is limited enough that by 2004 it has the smallest bureaucracy in the region, once economies of scale in state administration are accounted for.
We would, of course, see different patterns if we plotted data for different time periods. As Seán Hanley notes in his review in this issue, for example, most of the increase in Slovakia's bureaucracy reported in Rebuilding Leviathan occurred between 1989 and 1992, and so that change is not picked up in Figure 4 . Moreover, other data sources may provide a different picture. The data in Runaway State-Building suggest that the fastest growth in the Slovak state administration took place later, from 1994 to 1997. To the extent that is the case, Slovakia's 'relative' growth during the period examined here might have been positive rather than negative. Notwithstanding these caveats, the approach to measuring bureaucratic size and growth presented here suggests new questions about state-building in both the socialist and post-socialist eras and so points to a research agenda that moves beyond Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-Building. I turn to these questions in the following section.
Unanswered questions
For both their empirical and theoretical contributions, Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-Building will serve as the starting point for future research on East European state-building. For those who would work in this literature, let me propose three questions for which I believe we do not yet have complete answers: 1. Why did some post-communist countries inherit bureaucracies that were bigger (adjusting for economies of scale in state administration) than others? Hungary's position as an outlier in Figure 4 suggests that the degree of market reform under socialism may have played a role, though that explanation does not work so well for some other countries in the sample. 6 In general, the better we understand the sources of variation in socialist-era bureaucracies, the better we can identify the impact on transition outcomes of variation in post-socialist bureaucracies.
Is the convergence to a common bureaucracy size (adjusting for economies of scale in state administration) a long-term trend affecting most or all countries in the region?
This is really two questions: will the pattern identifi ed here hold over time, and does it hold for other countries in the region? To the extent that the answer to both questions is yes, we may want to revisit the 'functionalist' explanations for variation in bureaucratic growth generally discounted by both In some contexts -economic growth, for example -the cause of convergence is clear. To the extent that post-communist bureaucracies are converging to a common size, the mechanism is less obvious. Intuitively, it seems that external infl uence must be a factor, and indeed Rebuilding Leviathan documents that pressure from the European Union played an important (if late) role in constraining exploitation of the state in countries with weak party competi-6 Following Rebuilding Leviathan, for Poland and Hungary I used data for which the reporting unit is household rather than establishment [Grzymała-Busse 2007: 234] . If instead I use establishment data for these two countries, then Hungary is less of an outlier. As before, however, there is strong evidence of economies of scale in state administration in both 1992 and 2004, with an increase in fi t from the fi rst year to the second.
tion. At the same time, the discussion of regional decentralisation in Runaway State-Building shows that external infl uence and domestic considerations often interact in unexpected ways. Convincing answers to these questions will advance our understanding of post-communist state-building, and of the state more generally, beyond the highwater mark set by Rebuilding Leviathan and Runaway State-Building.
